

# BAYESIAN EXPERT AGGREGATION

## US-Israel vs Iran Conflict Scenario Forecasting

*Expanded 15-Expert Panel | 113 Scored Predictions | 100,000 Monte Carlo Draws*

*Report Date: March 1, 2026*

*Panel includes dovish, hawkish, and independent analysts to ensure ideological balance.*

*Weighting is purely empirical: past accuracy determines influence on consensus.*

## Part 1: Methodology

### 1.1 Expert Reliability: Beta-Distributed Posteriors

Each expert's track record is scored on a 5-point scale: TRUE (1.0), MOSTLY TRUE (0.75), PARTIAL (0.5), MOSTLY FALSE (0.25), FALSE (0.0). These scores feed a Beta distribution posterior using Jeffreys prior  $\text{Beta}(0.5, 0.5)$ :

$$\text{Alpha} = (\text{sum of scores}) + 0.5, \text{Beta} = (N - \text{sum of scores}) + 0.5$$

The mean  $E[p] = \text{alpha} / (\text{alpha} + \text{beta})$  gives each expert's expected accuracy. Critically, uncertainty is preserved: an expert with 5 predictions at 0.75 has a wider posterior than one with 20 predictions at 0.75.

### 1.2 Scenario Predictions: Dirichlet Distributions

Each expert's scenario probability vector (which must sum to 1.0) is modeled as a Dirichlet distribution. The concentration parameter  $\kappa$  reflects how confident/specific the expert's stated position is. A higher  $\kappa$  means the expert's views are more precise; a lower  $\kappa$  allows more variation. Scenario probabilities are inferred from each expert's published writings, testimonies, and public statements.

### 1.3 Monte Carlo Aggregation (N = 100,000)

For each of 100,000 simulation draws: (1) Sample each expert's reliability from their Beta posterior. (2) Sample each expert's scenario prediction from their Dirichlet. (3) Compute three aggregation methods: Linear Pool (reliability-weighted average), Logarithmic Pool (geometric weighted average), and an Extremized correlation-adjusted estimate.

### 1.4 Correlation Adjustment

A 15x15 correlation matrix captures shared information between experts. The FDD cluster (Dubowitz, Gerecht, Ben Taleblu, Schanzer) shares institutional overlap (0.45-0.60). The realist cluster (Mearsheimer, Sachs, Kinzer) shares framework overlap (0.40-0.50). Cross-ideology correlations are lower (0.05-0.25). Eigenvalue decomposition yields the effective number of independent experts (10.13 out of 15), producing an extremizing factor  $d = 0.675$  per the Satopaa et al. (2014) method.

### 1.5 Uncertainty Quantification

All results include Highest Density Intervals (HDIs) at 80% and 95% credibility. These are proper Bayesian intervals computed from the MC posterior, not normal approximations. The HDI identifies the narrowest interval containing the specified probability mass.

### 1.6 Ideological Balance Design

The 15-expert panel is deliberately balanced: 7 dovish/anti-interventionist analysts (Mearsheimer, Sachs, Kinzer, Bajoghli, Vaez, Ritter, Crooke), 6 hawkish/interventionist analysts (Dubowitz, Gerecht, Rubin, Takeyh, Ben Taleblu, Schanzer), and 2 independent/other (Molyneux, Friedman). The model does not assign ideological weights; accuracy alone determines influence. If hawks had better track records, they would naturally dominate the consensus.



## Part 2: Expert Reliability Scores

### 2.1 Expert Summary Table

Expert	Affiliation	Camp	N	Beta Posterior	E[p] (Accuracy)
<b>John Mearsheimer</b>	U. Chicago (Realist)	Dovish	8	Beta(7.75, 1.25)	<b>0.861</b>
<b>Ali Vaez</b>	Intl Crisis Group (ICG)	Dovish	6	Beta(5.75, 1.25)	<b>0.821</b>
<b>Stephen Kinzer</b>	Boston Univ / Author	Dovish	7	Beta(6.25, 1.75)	<b>0.781</b>
<b>Narges Bajoghli</b>	Johns Hopkins (Ethnographer)	Dovish	5	Beta(4.50, 1.50)	<b>0.750</b>
<b>Behnam Ben Taleblu</b>	FDD Iran Program Dir.	Hawkish	7	Beta(5.75, 2.25)	<b>0.719</b>
<b>Jeffrey Sachs</b>	Columbia / UN Advisor	Dovish	8	Beta(6.00, 3.00)	<b>0.667</b>
<b>Ray Takeyh</b>	CFR Sr Fellow	Hawkish	8	Beta(6.00, 3.00)	<b>0.667</b>
<b>Jonathan Schanzer</b>	FDD Exec Director	Hawkish	7	Beta(5.25, 2.75)	<b>0.656</b>
<b>Mark Dubowitz</b>	FDD (CEO)	Hawkish	8	Beta(5.75, 3.25)	<b>0.639</b>
<b>Alastair Crooke</b>	Conflicts Forum / Ex-MI6	Dovish	8	Beta(5.50, 3.50)	<b>0.611</b>
<b>George Friedman</b>	Geopolitical Futures	Other	9	Beta(5.75, 4.25)	<b>0.575</b>
<b>Michael Rubin</b>	AEI / Middle East Forum	Hawkish	8	Beta(4.50, 4.50)	<b>0.500</b>
<b>Scott Ritter</b>	Ex-UNSCOM Inspector	Dovish	9	Beta(3.75, 6.25)	<b>0.375</b>
<b>Reuel Marc Gerecht</b>	FDD / Ex-CIA	Hawkish	8	Beta(3.00, 6.00)	<b>0.333</b>
<b>Stefan Molyneux</b>	Independent/YouTube	Other	7	Beta(1.00, 7.00)	<b>0.125</b>

### 2.2 Ideological Balance Check

Group	Count	Avg Accuracy	Key Observation
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Dovish / Anti-Interventionist	7	<b>0.695</b>	Strong on intervention blowback
Hawkish / Interventionist	6	<b>0.586</b>	Strong on Iran technical threats
Other / Independent	2	<b>0.350</b>	Molyneux pulls average down

The accuracy gap between camps (0.695 vs 0.586) is moderate, not extreme. It is driven primarily by two outliers: Gerecht (0.333) pulling hawks down, and Ritter (0.375) pulling doves down. The highest-accuracy hawk (Ben Taleblu, 0.719) is comparable to mid-tier doves. This confirms the model is not simply privileging one ideology; data quality drives the weighting.

## Part 3: Complete Prediction Track Record (113 Predictions)

Expert	Prediction	Year	Score	Verdict	Category
<b>Stefan Molyneux</b>	Western civilization collapse imminent due to immigration	2015-19	0.00	FALSE	Geopolitical
<b>Stefan Molyneux</b>	Trump would transform US FP away from interventionism	2016	0.25	MOSTLY FALSE	Geopolitical
<b>Stefan Molyneux</b>	Brexit would trigger EU collapse within years	2016	0.00	FALSE	Geopolitical
<b>Stefan Molyneux</b>	Mass social breakdown in Sweden/Germany from migration	2017	0.25	MOSTLY FALSE	Regime
<b>Stefan Molyneux</b>	Canadian economy collapse under Trudeau	2017	0.00	FALSE	Economic
<b>Stefan Molyneux</b>	Iran deal withdrawal leads to quick Iranian capitulation	2018	0.00	FALSE	Geopolitical
<b>Stefan Molyneux</b>	Red wave in US midterms	2022	0.00	FALSE	Geopolitical
<b>John Mearsheimer</b>	NATO expansion would provoke Russian aggression vs Ukraine	2014	1.00	TRUE	Geopolitical
<b>John Mearsheimer</b>	Iraq War would be strategic disaster / quagmire	2003	1.00	TRUE	Military
<b>John Mearsheimer</b>	Israel lobby shapes US Mideast policy detrimentally	2006	0.75	MOSTLY TRUE	Geopolitical
<b>John Mearsheimer</b>	US pivot to Asia disrupted by Middle East entanglements	2012	0.75	MOSTLY TRUE	Geopolitical
<b>John Mearsheimer</b>	Libya intervention would create failed state / chaos	2011	1.00	TRUE	Military
<b>John Mearsheimer</b>	Ukraine conflict would become prolonged war of attrition	2022	1.00	TRUE	Military
<b>John Mearsheimer</b>	Great power competition (US-China) is the defining dynamic	2018	0.75	MOSTLY TRUE	Geopolitical
<b>John Mearsheimer</b>	US would not deter Russia from invading Ukraine	2021	1.00	TRUE	Military
<b>Jeffrey Sachs</b>	Iraq sanctions cause humanitarian catastrophe w/o regime change	1990s	1.00	TRUE	Economic
<b>Jeffrey Sachs</b>	Shock therapy would succeed in Poland	1990	0.75	MOSTLY TRUE	Economic
<b>Jeffrey Sachs</b>	Shock therapy would succeed in Russia similarly to Poland	1992	0.25	MOSTLY FALSE	Economic
<b>Jeffrey Sachs</b>	Iraq War would destabilize Middle East broadly	2003	1.00	TRUE	Military

<b>Jeffrey Sachs</b>	US sanctions on Iran hurt civilians w/o changing regime	2018	1.00	TRUE	Economic
<b>Jeffrey Sachs</b>	Multipolar world order emerging, reducing US unilateral power	2020	0.75	MOSTLY TRUE	Geopolitical
<b>Jeffrey Sachs</b>	Ukraine conflict could escalate toward nuclear confrontation	2022	0.25	MOSTLY FALSE	Military
<b>Jeffrey Sachs</b>	COVID origins debate suppressed then vindicated (lab leak)	2021	0.50	PARTIAL	Geopolitical
<b>George Friedman</b>	US-jihadist conflict would define post-9/11 era	2001	0.75	MOSTLY TRUE	Military
<b>George Friedman</b>	Russia would reassert regional power in former Soviet space	2009	1.00	TRUE	Geopolitical
<b>George Friedman</b>	EU structural crisis and fragmentation pressures	2011	0.75	MOSTLY TRUE	Geopolitical
<b>George Friedman</b>	Japan-China tensions would intensify	2011	0.50	PARTIAL	Geopolitical
<b>George Friedman</b>	Turkey would emerge as major regional power	2009	0.50	PARTIAL	Geopolitical
<b>George Friedman</b>	Poland would become key European power by 2030s	2009	0.25	MOSTLY FALSE	Geopolitical
<b>George Friedman</b>	US remains dominant through 2020s despite decline narratives	2011	0.75	MOSTLY TRUE	Geopolitical
<b>George Friedman</b>	Major US-Mexico tensions over immigration/ border	2009	0.75	MOSTLY TRUE	Geopolitical
<b>George Friedman</b>	Major US-Japan military tensions by 2050	2009	0.00	FALSE	Military
<b>Scott Ritter</b>	Iraq had no significant WMD stockpiles (pre-2003)	2002	1.00	TRUE	Nuclear
<b>Scott Ritter</b>	Iraq War would not be quick or easy victory	2003	0.50	PARTIAL	Military
<b>Scott Ritter</b>	US couldn't take Baghdad / leave with tail between legs	2003	0.25	MOSTLY FALSE	Military
<b>Scott Ritter</b>	Imminent US attack on Iran in June 2005	2005	0.00	FALSE	Military
<b>Scott Ritter</b>	Syria al-Kibar not a nuclear facility	2007	0.00	FALSE	Nuclear
<b>Scott Ritter</b>	Decisive Russian military victory in Ukraine in 2023	2023	0.25	MOSTLY FALSE	Military
<b>Scott Ritter</b>	Ukraine suffering unsustainable losses / cannot win	2022	0.50	PARTIAL	Military
<b>Scott Ritter</b>	Denied Russian responsibility for Bucha massacre	2022	0.00	FALSE	Geopolitical
<b>Scott Ritter</b>	Russian economy would survive Western sanctions	2022	0.75	MOSTLY TRUE	Economic

<b>Alastair Crooke</b>	Hamas election victory dynamics / Western miscalculation	2006	1.00	TRUE	Geopolitical
<b>Alastair Crooke</b>	Hezbollah survives 2006 Lebanon War, emerges stronger	2006	1.00	TRUE	Military
<b>Alastair Crooke</b>	Western intervention in Syria empowers jihadist groups	2012	1.00	TRUE	Military
<b>Alastair Crooke</b>	Assad regime would survive (with Russian/Iranian support)	2013-23	0.50	PARTIAL	Regime
<b>Alastair Crooke</b>	Resistance axis durable and strategically coherent	2020	0.25	MOSTLY FALSE	Geopolitical
<b>Alastair Crooke</b>	Hezbollah existence not in question after Nasrallah killed	Oct 2024	0.25	MOSTLY FALSE	Military
<b>Alastair Crooke</b>	Syria in much better place by end of 2017	2017	0.25	MOSTLY FALSE	Geopolitical
<b>Alastair Crooke</b>	US Syria strikes emotionally driven with lasting consequences	2017	0.75	MOSTLY TRUE	Military
<b>Narges Bajoghli</b>	Internal regime anxiety about youth legitimacy	2019	0.75	MOSTLY TRUE	Regime
<b>Narges Bajoghli</b>	Sanctions hurt Iranian civilians more than regime elites	2022	1.00	TRUE	Economic
<b>Narges Bajoghli</b>	Mahsa Amini protests = deep structural legitimacy crisis	2022	0.75	MOSTLY TRUE	Regime
<b>Narges Bajoghli</b>	IRGC internal dynamics more fractured than analysts assume	2019	0.75	MOSTLY TRUE	Regime
<b>Narges Bajoghli</b>	Sanctions would not change regime behavior on nuclear program	2022	0.75	MOSTLY TRUE	Nuclear
<b>Ali Vaez</b>	Framework leading to 2015 JCPOA nuclear deal	2013-15	0.75	MOSTLY TRUE	Nuclear
<b>Ali Vaez</b>	US withdrawal from JCPOA would accelerate enrichment	2018	1.00	TRUE	Nuclear
<b>Ali Vaez</b>	Iranian protests met with crackdown but not regime toppled	2019	1.00	TRUE	Regime
<b>Ali Vaez</b>	Maximum pressure sanctions fail to change regime behavior	2019	1.00	TRUE	Economic
<b>Ali Vaez</b>	Diplomacy still possible after Soleimani killing	2020	0.50	PARTIAL	Geopolitical
<b>Ali Vaez</b>	Iran would accelerate nuclear program after JCPOA collapse	2019	1.00	TRUE	Nuclear
<b>Stephen Kinzer</b>	1953 coup blowback pattern repeats in future interventions	2003	1.00	TRUE	Geopolitical
<b>Stephen Kinzer</b>	Iraq invasion follows failed regime change pattern	2003	1.00	TRUE	Military

<b>Stephen Kinzer</b>	US regime changes consistently produce worse outcomes	2006	0.75	<b>MOSTLY TRUE</b>	Geopolitical
<b>Stephen Kinzer</b>	Turkey and Iran natural long-term US partners (Reset)	2010	0.25	<b>MOSTLY FALSE</b>	Geopolitical
<b>Stephen Kinzer</b>	Libya intervention would create chaos	2011	1.00	<b>TRUE</b>	Military
<b>Stephen Kinzer</b>	US-Iran hostility rooted in 1953 continues to poison relations	2003+	1.00	<b>TRUE</b>	Geopolitical
<b>Stephen Kinzer</b>	US would eventually attempt military action against Iran	2006	0.75	<b>MOSTLY TRUE</b>	Military
<b>Mark Dubowitz</b>	JCPOA fatally flawed; sunset provisions create patient path to bomb	2015	0.75	<b>MOSTLY TRUE</b>	Nuclear
<b>Mark Dubowitz</b>	Maximum pressure sanctions would bring Iran to negotiating table	2018	0.25	<b>MOSTLY FALSE</b>	Economic
<b>Mark Dubowitz</b>	Iran sanctions can choke regime revenue if properly enforced	2018	0.50	<b>PARTIAL</b>	Economic
<b>Mark Dubowitz</b>	Soleimani killing wouldn't trigger 'World War Three'	2020	1.00	<b>TRUE</b>	Military
<b>Mark Dubowitz</b>	JCPOA sanctions relief funds Iran proxies (Hezbollah, Hamas)	2015	0.75	<b>MOSTLY TRUE</b>	Geopolitical
<b>Mark Dubowitz</b>	Iran's rial collapse signals regime economic vulnerability	2018-25	0.75	<b>MOSTLY TRUE</b>	Economic
<b>Mark Dubowitz</b>	Max pressure + max support empowers Iranians to dismantle regime	2020	0.25	<b>MOSTLY FALSE</b>	Regime
<b>Mark Dubowitz</b>	Biden admin lax enforcement enabled Iran oil revenue surge	2021-24	1.00	<b>TRUE</b>	Economic
<b>Reuel Marc Gerecht</b>	Iraq War won't destabilize the Mideast	2002	0.00	<b>FALSE</b>	Military
<b>Reuel Marc Gerecht</b>	US invasion of Iraq would provoke democratic revolution in Iran	2002	0.00	<b>FALSE</b>	Regime
<b>Reuel Marc Gerecht</b>	Iran is in no shape for prolonged confrontation with US	2019	0.25	<b>MOSTLY FALSE</b>	Military
<b>Reuel Marc Gerecht</b>	Iranian middle class/youth have given up on regime; will welcome change	2019	0.50	<b>PARTIAL</b>	Regime
<b>Reuel Marc Gerecht</b>	Negotiations with Iran are illusion; time for diplomacy shrinking fast	2007	0.25	<b>MOSTLY FALSE</b>	Nuclear
<b>Reuel Marc Gerecht</b>	Afghanistan intervention against Taliban justified and necessary	2001	0.75	<b>MOSTLY TRUE</b>	Military
<b>Reuel Marc Gerecht</b>	Petraeus surge was succeeding in Iraq	2007	0.50	<b>PARTIAL</b>	Military
<b>Reuel Marc Gerecht</b>	Pro-Iranian proxies in Iraq can be eradicated completely	2026	0.25	<b>MOSTLY FALSE</b>	Military
<b>Michael Rubin</b>	Iraq regime change would benefit regional stability	2002-03	0.00	<b>FALSE</b>	Military

<b>Michael Rubin</b>	Engaging rogue regimes like Iran is dangerous and counterproductive	2014	0.50	PARTIAL	Geopolitical
<b>Michael Rubin</b>	Chalabi as reliable US partner in post-Saddam Iraq	2003	0.00	FALSE	Geopolitical
<b>Michael Rubin</b>	Military strikes alone insufficient; regime itself is the problem	2012	0.75	MOSTLY TRUE	Nuclear
<b>Michael Rubin</b>	Turkey under Erdogan increasingly hostile to US interests	2015	1.00	TRUE	Geopolitical
<b>Michael Rubin</b>	Iranian regime won't moderate through diplomacy	2007	0.75	MOSTLY TRUE	Regime
<b>Michael Rubin</b>	Kurdish forces key US allies deserving of support	2014-19	0.75	MOSTLY TRUE	Military
<b>Michael Rubin</b>	Obama admin more antagonistic to Israel than rogue states	2014	0.25	MOSTLY FALSE	Geopolitical
<b>Ray Takeyh</b>	JCPOA sunset provisions leave Iran well-positioned for breakout	2015	0.75	MOSTLY TRUE	Nuclear
<b>Ray Takeyh</b>	Iran defense budget would double post-JCPOA; regional aggression increase	2017	0.75	MOSTLY TRUE	Military
<b>Ray Takeyh</b>	Snapback sanctions would never actually be implemented	2015	0.25	MOSTLY FALSE	Economic
<b>Ray Takeyh</b>	Iran a revolutionary state; normal negotiations won't work	2015	0.75	MOSTLY TRUE	Geopolitical
<b>Ray Takeyh</b>	Sanctions not crippling Iran; resistance economy survives	2022	0.75	MOSTLY TRUE	Economic
<b>Ray Takeyh</b>	Regime multi-layered; bombing alone won't topple it	2026	0.75	MOSTLY TRUE	Regime
<b>Ray Takeyh</b>	Air power can destroy nuclear/missile programs but Iran rebuilds	2026	0.75	MOSTLY TRUE	Military
<b>Ray Takeyh</b>	Killing Khamenei creates confusion but doesn't ensure regime change	2025-26	0.75	MOSTLY TRUE	Regime
<b>Behnam Ben Taleblu</b>	JCPOA sunset would enable Iran nuclear expansion	2015-18	0.75	MOSTLY TRUE	Nuclear
<b>Behnam Ben Taleblu</b>	Iran would transfer drones/missiles to Russia after arms embargo lifted	2020	1.00	TRUE	Military
<b>Behnam Ben Taleblu</b>	Iran ballistic missiles represent growing threat requiring attention	2018	0.75	MOSTLY TRUE	Military
<b>Behnam Ben Taleblu</b>	Iran cruise missile capability underestimated by West	2019	0.75	MOSTLY TRUE	Military
<b>Behnam Ben Taleblu</b>	Houthi missile capabilities pose genuine regional threat	2018	1.00	TRUE	Military
<b>Behnam Ben Taleblu</b>	Maximum pressure would alter regime's cost-benefit calculation	2019	0.25	MOSTLY FALSE	Economic

<b>Behnam Ben Taleblu</b>	IRGC-QF network requires kinetic + financial targeting	2020	0.75	<b>MOSTLY TRUE</b>	Geopolitical
<b>Jonathan Schanzer</b>	Hamas-Fatah split fundamental obstacle to Palestinian statehood	2008	0.75	<b>MOSTLY TRUE</b>	Geopolitical
<b>Jonathan Schanzer</b>	Iran's 'ring of fire' strategy to strangle Israel is strategic reality	2023	0.75	<b>MOSTLY TRUE</b>	Military
<b>Jonathan Schanzer</b>	JCPOA sanctions relief yields financial boon for Hamas/proxies	2021	0.75	<b>MOSTLY TRUE</b>	Geopolitical
<b>Jonathan Schanzer</b>	Turkey's HTS support makes it unreliable NATO ally	2024	0.75	<b>MOSTLY TRUE</b>	Geopolitical
<b>Jonathan Schanzer</b>	Iran's axis of resistance weakened but not eliminated after Israeli strikes	2024	0.75	<b>MOSTLY TRUE</b>	Military
<b>Jonathan Schanzer</b>	Houthi Red Sea threat requires decisive military response	2024	0.50	<b>PARTIAL</b>	Military
<b>Jonathan Schanzer</b>	Assad regime enduring (pre-Dec 2024 fall)	2013-23	0.50	<b>PARTIAL</b>	Regime

## Part 4: Final Scenario Forecasts

### 4.1 Consensus Forecast (Extremized, Correlation-Adjusted)

Scenario	Mean	Median	80% HDI	95% HDI	Std Dev
Quick Win / Regime Change	9.2%	8.9%	[5.4%, 12.2%]	[4.3%, 14.8%]	2.8%
Prolonged Quagmire	52.3%	52.4%	[45.1%, 59.7%]	[41.2%, 63.4%]	5.7%
Stalemate / De-escalation	21.9%	21.7%	[15.7%, 27.2%]	[13.5%, 31.1%]	4.5%
Catastrophic Spread	16.6%	16.2%	[11.2%, 21.2%]	[9.2%, 24.5%]	4.0%

### 4.2 Model Evolution: 4 -> 10 -> 15 Experts

Scenario	Orig (4-Exp)	10-Expert	15-Expert	Delta (15 vs 10)
Quick Win / Regime Change	25.0%	5.2%	9.2%	+4.0%
Prolonged Quagmire	53.0%	56.9%	52.3%	-4.6%
Stalemate / De-escalation	14.0%	18.8%	21.9%	+3.1%
Catastrophic Spread	8.0%	19.1%	16.6%	-2.5%

### 4.3 Key Structural Findings

**1. Quagmire remains dominant:** At 52.3%, prolonged attrition is the strong modal outcome. Adding hawkish experts pulled it down only ~4.6 percentage points from the 10-expert model (56.9%). Even the highest-accuracy hawks (Takeyh, Ben Taleblu) explicitly argue that air power alone cannot topple the Iranian regime.

**2. Quick Win recovers modestly:** From 5.2% (10-expert) to 9.2% (15-expert). Hawks like Dubowitz (30%) and Gerecht (25%) boost this, but their lower track-record accuracy limits their influence. Still under 10% consensus probability.

**3. Stalemate rises:** From 18.8% to 21.9%. Several hawks (Rubin at 30%, Takeyh at 28%) assign meaningful probability to a negotiated off-ramp, reflecting their policy sophistication even within interventionist frameworks.

**4. Catastrophe moderates:** Down from 19.1% to 16.6%. Hawks generally assign lower catastrophe probability (15-18%) than doves (20-30%), reflecting their assessment that Iranian conventional capabilities are degraded. The data partially validates this.

**5. FDD cluster gets discounted:** Four FDD experts (Dubowitz, Gerech, Ben Taleblu, Schanzer) share institutional correlations of 0.45-0.60. The correlation adjustment prevents their shared analytical framework from being counted four times. Effective independent experts: 10.13 out of 15.

**6. The accuracy gap is real but nuanced:** Dovish experts average 0.695 accuracy vs hawkish 0.586. This is driven largely by the Iraq War era: hawkish analysts who predicted Iraq would stabilize or catalyze Iranian democracy were systematically wrong. On Iran-specific technical assessments (JCPOA flaws, missile threats, proxy networks), hawks have strong records.

## Part 5: Technical Appendix

### 5.1 Model Parameters

Parameter	Value
Monte Carlo draws	N = 100,000
Prior	Jeffreys Beta(0.5, 0.5)
Total experts	15 (7 dovish, 6 hawkish, 2 other)
Total scored predictions	113
Correlation matrix	15x15 with FDD cluster (0.45-0.60), realist cluster (0.40-0.50)
Effective independent experts	10.13 out of 15 (eigenvalue method)
Extremizing factor d	0.675 (Satopaa et al. 2014)
Dirichlet kappa range	6-16 (confidence parameter per expert)
Aggregation methods	Linear Pool, Logarithmic Pool, Extremized (corr-adj)
HDI credibility levels	80% and 95%
Scoring scale	TRUE=1.0, MOSTLY TRUE=0.75, PARTIAL=0.5, MOSTLY FALSE=0.25, FALSE=0.0
Random seed	42 (for reproducibility)

### 5.2 Limitations

1. Prediction scoring is subjective. Different analysts could reasonably assign different verdict scores to the same prediction. The 5-point scale mitigates this vs binary scoring.
2. Scenario probability assignments are inferred from public statements, not elicited directly. Experts have not been surveyed to confirm the probability vectors attributed to them.
3. The correlation matrix is constructed from qualitative assessment of shared information sources and institutional affiliations, not estimated from data.
4. Several new hawkish experts (Gerecht, Rubin) have track records heavily shaped by the Iraq War era. Whether their post-2003 analytical evolution is captured in the static scoring is debatable.
5. The model treats all past predictions as equally weighted regardless of temporal proximity or difficulty. A more sophisticated model might discount older or easier predictions.
6. This is a living-conflict analysis. Ground truth for the four scenarios has not yet been determined. The consensus reflects expert-aggregated probabilities as of March 1, 2026, not certainty about outcomes.